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Abstract
This paper is concerned with the apparent greatest weakness of the Mathematical
Theory of Evidence (MTE) of Shafer [8], which has been strongly criticized by Wasser-
man [13].
Weaknesses of Shafer’s proposal [10] of probabilistic interpretation of MTE belief func-
tions is demonstrated. Thereafter a new probabilistic interpretation of MTE con-
forming both to definition of belief function and to Dempster’s rule of combination of
independent evidence. It is shown that shaferian conditioning of belief functions on
observations [10] may be treated as selection combined with modification of data, that
is data is not viewed as it is but it is casted into one’s beliefs in what it should be like..
1 Introduction
Wasserman in [13] raised serious concerns against the Mathematical Theory of Evidence
(MTE) developed by Dempster and Shafer since 1967 (see [11] for a thorough review of this
theory). One of arguments against MTE is related to Shafer’s attitude towards frequencies.
2 MIECZYS lAW A. K lOPOTEK
Shafer in [11] claims that probability theory developed over last years from the old-style
frequencies towards modern subjective probability theory within the framework of bayesian
theory. By analogy he claims that the very attempt to consider relation between MTE and
frequencies is old-fashioned and out of date and should be at least forbidden - for the sake of
progress of humanity. Wasserman opposes this view ([13], p.371) reminding ”major success
story in Bayesian theory”, the exchangeability theory of de Finetti [2]. It treats frequencies
as special case of bayesian belief. ”The Bayesian theory contains within it a definition of
frequency probability and a description of the exact assumptions necessary to invoke that
definition” [13]. Wasserman dismisses Shafer’s suggestion that probability relies on analogy
of frequency. .
Shafer, on the other hand, lets frequencies live a separate life. MTE beliefs and frequencies
are separated. But in this way we are left without a definition of frequentistic belief function
[13].
This paper presents an attempt to introduce a frequentistic definition of belief function
which shall be fully compatible with MTE. Section 2 reminds briefly basic definitions of MTE.
Section 3 demonstrates shortcomings of Shafer’s view of frequencies for belief functions.
Section 4 presents our denotation. Section 5 introduces the new frequentistic interpretation
of MTE. Section 6 summarizes the new interpretation.
2 Formal Definitions of MTE
Let Ξ be a finite set of elements called elementary events. Any subset of Ξ be a composite
event. Ξ be called also the frame of discernment.
A basic probability assignment function m:2Ξ → [0, 1] such that
∑
A∈2Ξ
|m(A)| = 1
m(∅) = 0
∀A∈2Ξ 0 ≤
∑
A⊆B
m(B)
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(|.| - absolute value.
A belief function be defined as Bel:2Ξ → [0, 1] so that Bel(A) =
∑
B⊆Am(B) A plausi-
bility function be Pl:2Ξ → [0, 1] with ∀A∈2Ξ P l(A) = 1−Bel(Ξ−A) A commonalty function
be Q:2Ξ → [0, 1] with ∀A∈2Ξ Q(A) =
∑
A⊆B m(B)
Furthermore, a Rule of Combination of two Independent Belief Functions Bel1, Bel2
Over the Same Frame of Discernment (the so-called Dempster-Rule), denoted
BelE1,E2 = BelE1 ⊕BelE2
is defined as follows: :
mE1,E2(A) = c ·
∑
B,C;A=B∩C
mE1(B) ·mE2(C)
(c - constant normalizing the sum of |m| to 1)
Whenever m(A) > 0, we say that A is the focal point of the Bel-Function. If the only
focal point of a belief function is Ξ (m(Ξ) = 1), then Bel is called vacuous belief function (it
does not contain any information on whatever value is taken by the variable).
Let B be a subset of Ξ, called evidence, mB be a basic probability assignment such
that mB(B) = 1 and mB(A) = 0 for any A different from B. Then the conditional belief
function Bel(.||B) representing the belief function Bel conditioned on evidence B is defined
as: Bel(.||B) = Bel ⊕BelB (Compare [10])
3 Basic Problems with Frequencies in MTE
Shafer in [9], [10] gave the following formal probabilistic interpretation of belief function:
Let Pr be a probabilistic measure over the sample space Ω, let Γ be a function Γ : Ω→ 2Ξ.
Then Bel over the space (frame of discernment) Ξ is given as:
Bel(A) = Pr({ω ∈ Ω|Γ(ω) ⊆ A})
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Table 1: Example of Γ function
No. A D Γ
1 a1 d1 {d1}
2 a2 d2 {d2, d3}
3 a2 d3 {d2, d3}
4 a3 d3 {d3}
5 a4 d1 {d1}
Then clearly
m(A) = Pr({ω ∈ Ω|Γ(ω) = A})
and
P l(A) = Pr({ω ∈ Ω|Γ(ω) ∩A 6= ∅})
Let us consider the database in Table 1.
Let the measurable A take values a1, a2, a3, a4, and let the non-observable attribute D
take values d1, d2, d3. Let us define the function Γ as capability to predict values of attribute
D given A and let us calculate it based on training sample contained in Table 1. We see that
if A takes value a1, then we know that D takes value d1 - hence Γ(A = a1) = {d1}. Similarly
values a3 and a4 of attribute A determine uniquely the value of attribute D. But in case of
A = a2 we have an ambiguity: D is equal either d2 or d3. Hence Γ(A = a1) = {d2, d3}. Now,
assuming frequency probabilities from Table 1 we calculate easily from Shafer’s formula:
m({d1}) = 0.4 Bel({d1}) = 0.4 P l({d1}) = 0.4
m({d2}) = 0 Bel({d2}) = 0 P l({d2}) = 0.4
m({d3}) = 0.2 Bel({d3}) = 0.2 P l({d3}) = 0.6
m({d1, d2}) = 0 Bel({d1, d2}) = 0.4 P l({d1, d2}) = 0.8
m({d1, d3}) = 0 Bel({d1, d3}) = 0.6 P l({d1, d3}) = 1
m({d2, d3}) = 0.4 Bel({d2, d3}) = 0.6 P l({d2, d3}) = 0.6
m({d1, d2, d3}) = 0 Bel({d1, d2, d3}) = 1 P l({d1, d2, d3}) = 1
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In probability theory two variables are independent if Pr(A ∩B) = Pr(A) · Pr(B). Let
us consider two measurables A and B from Table 2
Function Γ be, as previously, be prediction of value of variable D based on value of A,
and Γ′ be prediction of variable D given value of B. Let us define
Bel(Z) = Pr({ω ∈ Ω|Γ(ω) ⊆ Z})
Bel′(Z) = Pr({ω ∈ Ω|Γ′(ω) ⊆ Z})
Let us imagine that we want to combine information from attributes A and B to improve
prediction of D by formulating a new function Γ” being the base for a new belief function:
Bel”(Z) = Pr({ω ∈ Ω|Γ”(ω) ⊆ Z})
As observations being basis of functions Γ and Γ′ are obviously independent, so one
would expect that the belief function Bel” is simply the combination OF INDEPENDENT
EVIDENCE Bel and Bel′ via Dempster rule. And this is in fact the case:
Bel” = Bel ⊕ Bel′
But there is one weak point in all of this: Bel′ is (and will always be) a vacuous belief func-
tion, hence it does not contribute anything to our knowledge of the value of the attribute.
Reverting this example we can say that whenever we combine two non-vacuous belief func-
tions, then the measurements underlying their empirical calculation are for sure statistically
dependent. So we claim that:
Under Shafer’s frequentist interpretation, if two belief functions are (statistically) indepen-
dent then at least one of them is non-informative.
Another practical limitation of Shafer’s probabilistic interpretation is consideration of
conditional beliefs. Let as look at Table 3.
If we want to calculate conditional probability of A = a1 given observation that A
takes only one of values a1 or a2, we select cases from the database fitting the condition
A = a1 ∨ A = a2, and thereafter within this subset we calculate frequency probabilities:
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Table 2: Example of Γ′ function for a variable B independent of A
No. A B D Γ Γ′
1 a1 b1 d1 {d1} {d1, d2, d3}
2 a2 b1 d2 {d2, d3} {d1, d2, d3}
3 a2 b1 d3 {d2, d3} {d1, d2, d3}
4 a3 b1 d3 {d3} {d1, d2, d3}
5 a4 b1 d1 {d1} {d1, d2, d3}
6 a1 b2 d1 {d1} {d1, d2, d3}
7 a2 b2 d2 {d2, d3} {d1, d2, d3}
8 a2 b2 d3 {d2, d3} {d1, d2, d3}
9 a3 b2 d3 {d3} {d1, d2, d3}
10 a4 b2 d1 {d1} {d1, d2, d3}
11 a1 b3 d1 {d1} {d1, d2, d3}
12 a2 b3 d2 {d2, d3} {d1, d2, d3}
13 a2 b3 d3 {d2, d3} {d1, d2, d3}
14 a3 b3 d3 {d3} {d1, d2, d3}
15 a4 b3 d1 {d1} {d1, d2, d3}
16 a1 b4 d1 {d1} {d1, d2, d3}
17 a2 b4 d2 {d2, d3} {d1, d2, d3}
18 a2 b4 d3 {d2, d3} {d1, d2, d3}
19 a3 b4 d3 {d3} {d1, d2, d3}
20 a4 b4 d1 {d1} {d1, d2, d3}
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Table 3: Scheme of creation of conditional probability
No. A A = a1 ∨A = a2 A|A = a1 ∨ A = a2
1 a1 yes a1
2 a2 yes a2
3 a2 yes a2
4 a3 no −
5 a4 no −
Table 4: Example of conditioning in MTE
No. A D Γ Γ ∩ {d1, d2} Γ
′ =
6= ∅ Γ ∩ {d1, d2}
1 a1 d1 {d1} yes {d1}
2 a2 d2 {d2, d3} yes {d2}
3 a2 d3 {d2, d3} yes {d2}
4 a3 d3 {d3} no −
5 a4 d1 {d1} no −
Pr(A = a1|A = a1 ∨ A = a2) = 1/3 = 0.33.Now, based on Table 4 let us run similar
procedure for MTE beliefs.
Let us assume that we want to find out our degree of belief in values of D given that only
values d1 or d2 are allowed. For this purpose we restrict the set of cases to those cases Ω
′ for
which our function Γ has non-empty intersection with the set of values of interest. For this
group of cases we define the function Γ′(ω) = Γ(ω) ∩ {d1, d2}. Let :
Bel(Z) = Pr({ω ∈ Ω|Γ(ω) ⊆ Z})
Bel′(Z) = Pr({ω ∈ Ω′|Γ′(ω) ⊆ Z})
Additionally let us define the simple support function Bel” such that m”({d1, d2}) = 1.
It is easily seen that:
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Bel′ = Bel ⊕ Bel”
(as expected because the expression Bel⊕Bel”means shaferian conditioning on event {d1, d2}).
And everything would be O.K. if it were not that the function Γ′ has little to do with the
non-observable attribute D - compare line no.3 of Table 4. Let us remind that function
Γ represented by definition for a given observed value of variable A the set of potentially
possible values of attribute D, deducible from the training sample. For every object ω, if
we know the true value a of A one of the values from the set Γ(ω) was the true value of
D for this object ω. But within Γ′(ω) the true value of attribute D does not need to be
contained - compare line no.3 of Table 4. But, let us remind, Shafer claimed [9, 10] that
function Γ indicates that the variable takes for object ω one of the values Γ(ω). But we have
just demonstrated that already after a single step of conditioning function Γ′ simply tells
lies. Its meaning is not dependent solely on subpopulation Ω′, to which it refers, but also on
the history, how this population was selected. But we had for probability distributions that
after conditioning a variable for not rejected objects took always those values which were
indicated by the result of conditioning.
Both above failures of Shafer’s probabilistic interpretation of his own theory of evidence
were driving forces behind the elaboration of a new probabilistic interpretation of MTE pre-
sented subsequently.
We shall summarize this section saying that: Shafer’s probabilistic interpretation of
Dempster’s & Shafer’s Mathematical Theory of Evidence is not compatible with this the-
ory: It does not fit the Dempster’s rule of combination of independent evidence. .
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4 Denotation
F. Bacchus in his paper [1] on axiomatization of probability theory and first order logic
shows that probability should be considered as a quantifier binding free variables in first
order logic expressions just like universal and existential quantifiers do. So if e.g. α(x) is
an open expression with a free variable x then [α(x)]x means the probability of truth of the
expression α(x). (The quantifier []x binds the free variable x and yields a numerical value
ranging from 0 to 1 and meeting all the Kolmogoroff axioms). Within the expression [α(x)]x
the variable x is bound. See [1] on justification why other types of integration of probability
theory and first order logic or propositional logic fail. Also for justification of rejection of the
traditional view of probability as a function over sets. While sharing Bacchus’ view, we find
his notation a bit cumbersome so we change it to be similar to the universal and existential
quantifiers throughout this paper. Furthermore, Morgan [4] insisted that the probabilities be
always considered in close connection with the population they refer to. Bacchus’ expression
[α(x)]x we rewrite as:
Prob
P (x)
x
α(x) - the probability of α(x)] being true within the population P. The P (pop-
ulation) is a unary predicate with P(x)=TRUE indicating that the object x(∈ Ω, that is
element of a universe of objects) belongs to the population under considerations. If P and
P’ are populations such that ∀xP
′(x)→ P (x) (that is membership in P’ implies membership
in P, or in other words: P’ is a subpopulation of P), then we distinguish two cases:
case 1: (Prob
P (x)
x
P ′(x)) = 0 (that is probability of membership in P’ with respect to P is
equal 0) - then (according to [4]) for any expression α(x) in free variable x the following
holds for the population P’: (Prob
P
′(x)
x
α(x)) = 1
case 2: (Prob
P (x)
x
P ′(x)) > 0then (according to [4] for any expression α(x) in free variable x
the following holds for the population P’:
(
ProbP
′(x)
x
α(x)) =
Prob
P (x)
x
(α(x) ∧ P ′(x))
Prob
P (x)
x
P ′(x)
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We also use the following (now traditional) mathematical symbols:
∀xα(x) - always α(x) (universal quantifier)
∃xα(x) - there exists an x such that α(x) (existential quantifier)
α ∧ β - logical AND of expressions
∧
B α(B) - logical AND over all instantiations of the expression α(B)
in free variable B
α ∨ β - logical OR of expressions
∨
B α(B) - logical OR over all instantiations of the expression α(B) in
free variable B
¬ - logical negation
P ∩Q - intersection of two sets
P ∪Q - union of two sets
5 A New Interpretation of Belief Functions
The empirical meaning of a new interpretation of the MTE Belief function will be explained
by means of the following example:
Example 1 Let us consider a daily-life example. Buying a bottle of hair shampoo is not
a trivial task from both the side of the consumer and the manufacturer. If the consumer
arrives at the consciousness that the shampoos may fall into one of the four categories: high
quality products (excellent for maintaining cleanness and health of the consumer) (H), mod-
erate quality products (keeping just all Polish industry standards) (M), suspicious products
(violating some industry standards) (S) and products dangerous for health and life (contain-
ing bacteria or fungi or other microbes causing infectious or invasive diseases, containing
cancerogenous or poisonous substances etc.) (D), he has a hard time upon leaving his house
for shopping. Clearly, precise chemical, biochemical and medical tests exist which may pre-
cisely place the product into one of those obviously exclusive categories. But the Citizen1
1The term ”Citizen” was a fine socialist time descriptor allowing to avoid the cumbersome usage of words
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Coot2 usually neither has a private chemical laboratory nor enough money to make use of
required services. Hence Citizen Coot coins a personal set of ”quality” tests M1 mapping
the pair (bottle of shampoo, quality) into the set {TRUE, FALSE} (the letter O - object -
stands for bottle of shampoo, H, M, S, D indicate quality classes: high, moderate, suspicious,
dangerous):
1. If the shampoo is heavily advertised on TV then it is of high quality (M1(O, {H}) =
TRUE) and otherwise not (M1(O, {H}) = FALSE).
2. If the name of the shampoo was never heard on TV, but the bottle looks fine (pretty
colors, aesthetic shape of the bottle), then the shampoo must be of moderate quality
(M1(O, {M}) = TRUE) and otherwise not (M1(O, {M}) = FALSE).
3. If the packaging is not fine or the date of production is not readable on the bottle
or the product is out of date, but the shampoo smells acceptably otherwise then it is
suspicious (M1(O, {S}) = TRUE) and otherwise not (M1(O, {S}) = FALSE).
4. If either the packaging is not fine or the date of production is not readable on the bottle
or the product is out of date, and at the same time the shampoo smells awfully, then
it is dangerous (M1(O, {D}) = TRUE and otherwise not (M1(O, {D}) = FALSE).
Notice that the criteria are partially rational: a not fine looking bottle may in fact
indicate some decaying processing of the shampoo or at least that the product remains for
a longer time on the shelf already. Bad smell is usually caused by development of some
bacteria dangerous for human health.Notice also that test for high and moderate quality are
enthusiastic, while the other two are more cautious.
Notice that the two latter tests are more difficult to carry out in a shop than the leading
two (the shop assistant would hardly allow to open a bottle before buying). Also, there may
like ”Mr.”, ”Mrs.” and ”Miss”
2This family name was coined as abbreviation for ”Citizen Of Our Town”
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be no time to check whether the shampoo was actually advertised on TV or not (as the
son who carefully watches all the running advertisements stayed home and does his lessons).
Hence some simplified tests may be quite helpful:
• M1(O, {S,D}): If the packaging is not fine or the product is out of date or the
production date is not readable then the product is either suspicious or dangerous
(M1(O, {S,D}) = TRUE and otherwise not (M1(O, {D,S}) = FALSE). .
• M1(O, {H,M}): If the packaging looks fine, then the product is either of high or
moderate quality (M1(O, {M,H}) = TRUE and otherwise not (M1(O, {M,H}) =
FALSE)..
Clearly these tests are far from being precise ones, but for the Citizen Coot no better tests
will be ever available. What is more, they are not exclusive: if one visits a dubious shop at
a later hour, one may buy a product meeting both M1(O, {H}) and M1(O, {D}) as defined
above !
Let us assume we have two types of shops in our town: good ones (G) and bad ones
(B). (Let M2 : Ω× 2{G,B} → {TRUE, FALSE} indicate for each shampoo in which shop
type it was available. Further, let M3 : Ω× 2{H,M,S,D}×{G,B} → {TRUE, FALSE} indicate
for each shampoo both its quality and the type of shop it was available from. Let clearly
M1(O,Quality) ∧M2(O, Shop) =M3(O,Quality × Shop).
The good shops are those with new furniture, well-clothed shop assistants. Bad ones are those
with always dirty floor or old furniture, or badly clothed shop assistants. Clearly, again, both
shop categories may be considered (nearly) exclusive as seldom well clothed shop assistants
do not care of floors. Let us assume we have obtained the statistics of shampoo sales in our
town presented in Table 1.
Rows and columns are marked with those singleton tests which were passed (e.g. in
the left upper corner there are 20 shampoo bottles sold in an undoubtedly bad shop and
having exclusively high quality, that is for all those bottles (O) M1(O, {H}) = TRUE,
M1(O, {M}) = FALSE,M1(O, {S}) = FALSE,M1(O, {D}) = FALSE, andM2(O, {B}) =
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Table 5: Sold shampoos statistics
Quality true for Shop type B G B,G Total
H 20 100 70 190
M 80 100 110 290
S 50 5 15 70
D 10 1 3 14
H,S 15 10 14 39
M,S 30 20 25 75
H,D 8 2 3 13
M,D 15 7 10 32
total 228 245 250 723
TRUE, M2(O, {G}) = FALSE.) The measurement of M1(O, {H}) would yield TRUE for
190+39+13 =242 bottles and FALSE for the remaining 581 bottles, the measurement of
M1(O, {D}) would yield TRUE for 14+13+32=59 bottles, and FALSE for the remaining
664 bottles. The measurement M1(O, {S,D}) will turn true in 70+14+ 39+75+ 13+12
=343 cases and FALSE in the remaining 480 cases.✸
In general let us assume that we know that objects of a population can be described
by an intrinsic attribute X taking exclusively one of the n discrete values from its domain
Ξ = {v1, v2, ..., vn} . Let us assume furthermore that to obtain knowledge of the actual value
taken by an object we must apply a measurement method (a system of tests) M
Definition 1 X be a set-valued attribute taking as its values non-empty subsets of a finite
domain Ξ. By a measurement method of value of the attribute X we understand a function:
M : Ω× 2Ξ → {TRUE, FALSE}
. where Ω is the set of objects, (or population of objects) such that
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• ∀ω;ω∈Ω M(ω,Ξ) = TRUE (X takes at least one of values from Ξ)
• ∀ω;ω∈Ω M(ω, ∅) = FALSE
• whenever M(ω,A) = TRUE for ω ∈ Ω, A ⊆ Ξ then for any B such that A ⊂ B
M(ω,B) = TRUE holds,
• whenever M(ω,A) = TRUE for ω ∈ Ω, A ⊆ Ξ and if card(A) > 1 then there exists
B, B ⊂ A such that M(ω,B) = TRUE holds.
• for every ω and every A either M(ω,A) = TRUE or M(ω,A) = FALSE (but never
both).
M(ω,A) tells us whether or not any of the elements of the set A belong to the actual value
of the attribute X for the object ω.
The measuring function M(O,A), if it takes the value TRUE, states for an object O and
a set A of values from the domain of X that the X takes for this object (at least) one of the
values in A.
Let us furthermore assume that with each application of the measurement procedure
some costs are connected, increasing roughly with the decreasing size of the tested set A so
that we are ready to accept results of previous measurements in the form of pre-labeling of
the population. So
Definition 2 A label L of an object ω ∈ Ω is a subset of the domain Ξ of the attribute X.
A labeling under the measurement method M is a function l : Ω → 2Ξ such that for any
object ω ∈ Ω either l(ω) = ∅ or M(ω, l(ω)) = TRUE.
Each labelled object (under the labeling l) consists of a pair (Oj, Lj), Oj - the j
th object,
Lj = l(Oj) - its label.
By a population under the labeling l we understand the predicate P : Ω→ {TRUE, FALSE}
of the form P (ω) = TRUE iff l(ω) 6= ∅ (or alternatively, the set of objects for which this
predicate is true)
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If for every object of the population the label is equal to Ξ then we talk of an unlabeled
population (under the labeling l), otherwise of a pre-labelled one.
Let us assume that in practice we apply a modified measurement method Ml being a
function:
Definition 3 Let l be a labeling under the measurement method M . Let us consider the
population under this labeling. The modified measurement method
Ml : Ω× 2
Ξ → {TRUE, FALSE}
where Ω is the set of objects, is is defined as
Ml(ω,A) =M(ω,A ∩ l(ω))
(Notice that Ml(ω,A) = FALSE whenever A ∩ l(ω) = ∅.)
For a labeled object (Oj, Lj) (Oj - proper object, Lj - its label) and a set A of values
from the domain of X, the modified measurement method tells us that X takes one of the
values in A if and only if it takes in fact a value from intersection of A and Lj . Expressed
differently, we discard a priori any attribute not in the label.
Please pay attention also to the fact, that given a population P for which the measure-
ment method M is defined, the labeling l (according to its definition) selects a subset of
this population, possibly a proper subset, namely the population P’ under this labeling.
P ′(ω) = P (ω) ∧M(ω, l(ω)). Hence also Ml is defined possibly for the ”smaller” population
P’ than M is.
Example 2 To continue Citizen Coot example, we may believe that in good shops only
moderate and high quality products are available, that is we assign to every shampoo ω
the label l(ω) = ∅ (we discard it from our register) if ω denies our belief that there are
no suspicious nor dangerous products in a good shop, and l(ω) = {H,M} if it is moderate
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Table 6: Modified sold shampoos statistics
Quality true for Shop type B G B,G Total
H 20 112 70 202
M 80 127 110 317
S 65 0 0 65
D 13 0 0 13
H,S 15 0 14 29
M,S 30 0 25 55
H,D 8 0 3 11
M,D 15 0 10 25
total 246 239 232 717
or high quality product in a good shop and l(ω) = Ξ to all the other products. After
this rejection of shampoos not fitting our beliefs we have to do with (a bit smaller) sold-
shampoos-population from Table 2.
Please notice the following changes: Suspicious and dangerous products encountered in
good shops were totally dropped from the statistics (their existence was not revealed to the
public). Suspicious and dangerous products from shops with unclear classification (good/bad
shops) were declared to come from bad shops. Products from good shops which obtained
both the label high quality and dangerous were simply moved into the category high quality
products (the bad smelt was just concealed) etc. This is frequently the sense in which
our beliefs have impact on our attitude towards real facts and we will see below that the
Dempster-Shafer Theory reflects such a view of beliefs. ✸
Let us now define the following function:
Definition 4
BelMP (A) =
ProbP (O)
O
(¬M(O,Ξ−A))
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which is the probability that the test M, while being true for A, rejects every hypothesis of the
form X=vi for every vi not in A for the population P. We shall call this function ”the belief
exactly in the the result of measurement”.
Let us define also the function:
Definition 5
P lMP (A) =
ProbP (O)
O
(M(O,A))
which is the probability of the test M holding for A for the population P. Let us refer to this
function as the ”Plausibility of taking any value from the set A”.
Last not least be defined the function:
Definition 6
mMP (A) =
ProbP (O)
O
(
∧
B;B={vi}⊆A
M(O,B) ∧
∧
B;B={vi}⊆Ξ−A
¬M(O,B))
which is the probability that all the tests for the singleton subsets of A are true and those
outside of A are false for the population P.
Let us illustrate the above concepts with Citizen Coot example:
Example 3 For the belief function for sold-bottles-population and the measurement func-
tion M3, if we identify probability with relative frequency, we have the focal points given in
the Table 5:✸
It is easily seen that:
THEOREM 1 mMP is the mass Function in the sense of MTE.
PROOF: We shall recall the definition and construction of the DNF (Disjunctive Normal
Form). If, given an object O of a population P under the measurement method M, we
look at the expression
expr(A) =
∧
B;B={vi}⊆A
M(O,B) ∧
∧
B;B={vi}⊆Ξ−A
¬M(O,B)
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Table 7: Mass and Belief Function under Measurement Method M3
Set mM
3
P Bel
M3
P
{(H,B) } 20/723 20/723
{(H,G) } 100/723 100/723
{(H,B),(H,G) } 70/723 190/723
{(M,B) } 80/723 80/723
{(M,G) } 100/723 100/723
{(M,B),(M,G) } 110/723 290/723
{(S,B) } 50/723 50/723
{(S,G) } 5/723 5/723
{(S,B),(S,G) } 15/723 70/723
{(D,B) } 10/723 10/723
{(D,G) } 1/723 1/723
{(D,B),(D,G) } 3/723 14/723
{(H,B),(S,B) } 15/723 85/723
{(H,G),(S,G) } 10/723 115/723
{(H,B),(S,B),(H,G),(S,G) } 14/723 299/723
{(M,B),(S,B) } 30/723 160/723
{(M,G),(S,G) } 20/723 125/723
{(M,B),(S,B),(M,G),(S,G) } 25/723 435/723
{(H,B),(D,B) } 8/723 38/723
{(H,G),(D,G) } 2/723 103/723
{(H,B),(D,B),(H,G),(D,G) } 3/723 217/723
{(M,B),(D,B) } 15/723 105/723
{(M,G),(D,G) } 7/723 108/723
{(M,B),(D,B),(M,G),(D,G) } 10/723 336/723
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for two different sets A1, A2 ⊆ Ξ then clearly expr(A1) ∧ expr(A2) is never true - the
truth of the one excludes the truth of the other. They represent mutually exclusive
events in the sense of the probability theory. On the other hand:
∨
A;A⊆Ξ
expr(A) = TRUE
hence:
(
ProbP (O)
O
(
∨
A;A⊆Ξ
expr(A))) = (
ProbP (O)
O
TRUE) = 1
and due to mutual exclusiveness:
∑
A;A⊆Ξ
(
ProbP (O)
O
expr(A)) = 1
which means:
∑
A;A⊆Ξ
mMP (A) = 1
Hence the first condition of Def.1 is satisfied.Due to the second condition of Def.1 we
have
(
ProbP (O)
O
expr(∅)) = 1− (
ProbP (O)
O
(M(O,Ξ))) =
= 1− (
ProbP (O)
O
TRUE) = 1− 1 = 0
Hence
mMP (∅) = 0
.The last condition is satisfied due to the very nature of probability: Probability is
never negative. So we can state that mMP is really a Mass Function in the sense of the
MTE. Q.e.d.✷
THEOREM 2 BelMP is a Belief Function in the sense of MTE corresponding to the m
M
P .
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PROOF: Let A be a non-empty set. By definition
M(O,Ξ− A) =
∨
C={vi}⊆Ξ−A
M(O,C)
hence by de-Morgan-law:
¬M(O,Ξ− A) =
∧
C={vi}⊆Ξ−A
¬M(O,C)
On the other hand, ¬M(O,Ξ− A) implies M(O,A).
But :
M(O,A) =
∨
B⊆A

 ∧
C;C={vi}⊆B
M(O,C) ∧
∧
C;C={vi}⊆A−B
¬M(O,C)


So .
¬M(O,Ξ− A) = ¬M(O,Ξ− A) ∧M(O,A) =
=
∧
C;C={vi}⊆Ξ−A
¬M(O,C) ∧M(O,A) =
=
∧
C;C={vi}⊆Ξ−A
¬M(O,C) ∧

 ∨
B⊆A

 ∧
C;C={vi}⊆B
M(O,C)∧
∧
∧
C;C={vi}⊆A−B
¬M(O,C)



 =
=
∨
B⊆A

 ∧
C;C={vi}⊆B
M(O,C) ∧
∧
C;C={vi}⊆Ξ−A
¬M(O,C)∧
∧
∧
C;C={vi}⊆A−B
¬M(O,C)

 =
=
∨
B⊆A

 ∧
C;C={vi}⊆B
M(O,C) ∧
∧
C;C={vi}⊆Ξ−B
¬M(O,C)


Hence
¬M(O,Ξ−A) =
∨
B⊆A
expr(B)
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and therefore:
(
ProbP (O)
O
¬M(O,Ξ− A)) = (
ProbP (O)
O
∨
B⊆A
expr(B))
expr(A) being defined as in the previous proof. As we have shown in the proof of
the previous theorem, expressions under the probabilities of the right hand side are
exclusive events, and therefore:
(
ProbP (O)
O
¬M(O,Ξ− A)) =
∑
B⊆A
(
ProbP (O)
O
expr(B))
that is:
BelMP (A ∈ 2
Ξ) =
∑
B⊆A
mMP (B)
As the previous theorem shows that mMP is a MTE Mass Function, it suffices to show
the above. Q.e.d.✷
THEOREM 3 P lMP is a Plausibility Function in the sense of MTE and it is the Plausibility
Function corresponding to the BelMP .
PROOF: By definition:
P lMP (A) =
ProbM(O)
O
(O,A)
hence
P lMP (A) = 1− (
ProbP (O)
O
¬M(O,A))
But by definition:
(
ProbP (O)
O
¬M(O,A)) = (
ProbP (O)
O
¬M(O,Ξ− (Ξ− A))) = BelMP (Ξ− A)
hence
P lMP (A) = 1−Bel
M
P (Ξ− A)
Q.e.d.✷
Two important remarks must be made concerning this particular interpretation:
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• Bel and Pl are both defined, contrary to many traditional approaches, as THE proba-
bilities and NOT as lower or upper bounds to any probability.
• It is Pl(A) (and not Bel(A) as assumed traditionally) that expresses the probability of
A, and Bel(A) refers to the probability of the complementary set AC .
Of course, a complementary measurement function is conceivable to revert the latter
effect, but the intuition behind such a measurement needs some elaboration. We shall not
discuss this issue in this paper.
Let us also define the following functions referred to as labelled Belief, labelled Plausibility
and labelled Mass Functions respectively for the labeled population P:
Definition 7 Let P be a population and l its labeling. Then
BelMlP (A) =
ProbP (ω)
ω
¬Ml(ω,Ξ− A)
P lMlP (A) =
ProbP (ω)
ω
Ml(ω,A)
mMlP (A) =
ProbP (ω)
ω
(
∧
B;B={vi}⊆A
Ml(ω,B) ∧
∧
B;B={vi}⊆Ξ−A
¬Ml(ω,B))
Let us illustrate the above concepts with Citizen Coot example:
Example 4 For the belief function for sold-bottles-population P and the measurement func-
tion M3, let us assume the following labeling:
l(ω) ={(H,G),(H,B),(M,G),(M,B),(S,B),(D,B)}
for every ω ∈ Ω, which means that we are convinced that only high and moderate quality
products are sold in good shops.For the population P’ under this labeling, if we identify
probability with relative frequency, we have the focal points given in the Table 5:✸
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Table 8: Mass and Belief Function under Modified Measurement Method M3l
Set m
M3
l
P ′ Bel
M3
l
P ′
{(H,B) } 20/717 20/717
{(H,G) } 112/717 112/717
{(H,B),(H,G) } 70/717 202/717
{(M,B) } 80/717 80/717
{(M,G) } 127/717 127/717
{(M,B),(M,G) } 110/717 317/717
{(S,B) } 65/717 65/717
{(D,B) } 13/717 13/717
{(H,B),(S,B) } 15/717 100/717
{(H,B),(S,B),(H,G) } 14/717 184/717
{(M,B),(S,B) } 30/717 175/717
{(M,B),(S,B),(M,G) } 25/717 387/717
{(H,B),(D,B) } 8/717 41/717
{(H,B),(D,B),(H,G) } 3/717 114/717
{(M,B),(D,B) } 15/717 108/717
{(M,B),(D,B),(M,G) } 10/717 228/717
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It is easily seen that:
THEOREM 4 mMlP is the mass Function in the sense of MTE.
PROOF: To show this is suffices to show that the modified measurement method Ml
possesses the same properties as the measurement method M .
Let us consider a labeling l and a population P under this labeling.
Let O be an object and L its label under labeling l (L = l(O)). Always Ml(O,Ξ) =
TRUE because by definition Ml(O,Ξ) =M(O,Ξ∩L) =M(O,L) and by definition of
a labeled population for the object’s O label L M(O,L) = TRUE.
Second, the superset consistency is satisfied, because if A ⊂ B then if Ml(O,A) =
TRUE then also Ml(O,A) =M(O,A∩L) = TRUE, but because A∩L ⊆ B ∩L then
also M(O,B ∩ L) = TRUE, but by definition M(O,B ∩ L) = Ml(O,B) = TRUE
and thus it was shown that Ml(O,A) = TRUE implies Ml(O,B) = TRUE for any
superset B of the set A.
Finally, also the subset consistency holds, because ifM(O,L∩A) = TRUE then there
exists a proper subset B of L ∩ A such that M(O,B) = TRUE. But in this case
B = L ∩ B so we can formally write: M(O,L ∩ B) = TRUE. Hence we see that
Ml(O,A) = TRUE implies the existence of a proper subset B of the set A such that
Ml(O,B) = TRUE. Hence considering analogies between definitions of m
M
P and mP
M
l
as well as between the respective Theorems we see immediately that this Theorem is
valid.
Q.e.d.✷
THEOREM 5 BelMlP is a Belief Function in the sense of MTE corresponding to the m
Ml
P .
PROOF: As Ml is shown to be a MTE Mass Function and considering analogies between
definitions of BelMP and BelP
M
l as well as between the respective Theorems we see
immediately that this Theorem is valid. Q.e.d.✷
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THEOREM 6 P lMlP is a Plausibility Function in the sense of MTE and it is the Plausibility
Function corresponding to the BelMlP .
PROOF: As Ml is shown to be a MTE Mass Function and considering analogies between
definitions of P lMP and P lP
M
l as well as between the respective Theorems we see im-
mediately that this Theorem is valid. Q.e.d.✷
This does not complete the interpretation.
Let us now assume we run a ”(re-)labelling process” on the (pre-labelled or unlabeled)
population P.
Definition 8 Let M be a measurement method, l be a labeling under this measurement
method, and P be a population under this labeling (Note that the population may also be
unlabeled). The (simple) labelling process on the population P is defined as a functional
LP : 2Ξ×Γ→ Γ, where Γ is the set of all possible labelings under M , such that for the given
labeling l and a given nonempty set of attribute values L (L ⊆ Ξ), it delivers a new labeling
l′ (l′ = LP (L, l)) such that for every object ω ∈ Ω:
1. if Ml(ω, L) = FALSE then l
′(ω) = ∅
(that is l’ discards a labeled object (ω, l(ω)) if Ml(ω, L) = FALSE
2. otherwise l′(ω) = l(ω) ∩ L (that is l’ labels the object with l(ω) ∩ L otherwise.
Remark: It is immediately obvious, that the population obtained as the sample fulfills
the requirements of the definition of a labeled population.
The labeling process clearly induces from P another population P’ (a population under
the labeling l′) being a subset of P (hence perhaps ”smaller” than P) labelled a bit differently.
If we retain the primary measurement method M then a new modified measurement method
Ml′ is induced by the new labeling.
Definition 9 ”labelling process function” mLP ;L : 2Ξ → [0, 1]: is defined as:
mLP ;L(L) = 1
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∀B;B∈2Ξ,B 6=Lm
LP ;L(B) = 0
It is immediately obvious that:
THEOREM 7 mLP ;L is a Mass Function in sense of MTE.
Let BelLP,L be the belief and P lLP,L be the Plausibility corresponding to mLP,L. Now let
us pose the question: what is the relationship between Bel
M
l′
P ′ , Bel
Ml
P , and Bel
LP,L.
THEOREM 8 Let M be a measurement function, l a labeling, P a population under this
labeling. Let L be a subset of Ξ. Let LP be a labeling process and let l′ = LP (L, l). Let P’ be
a population under the labeling l′. Then Bel
M
l′
P ′ is a combination via Dempster’s Combination
rule of BelMl, and BelLP ;L., that is:
Bel
M
l′
P ′ = Bel
Ml
P ⊕Bel
LP ;L
.
PROOF: Let us consider a labeled object (Oj, Lj) from the population P (before re-
labeling, that is Lj = l(Oj)) which passed the relabeling and became (Oj, Lj ∩ L),
that is Lj ∩ L = l
′(Oj).. Let us define exprB (before relabeling) and exprA (after
labeling) as:
exprB((Oj, Lj), A) =
∧
B;B={vi}⊆A
Ml(O,B)∧
∧
∧
B;B={vi}⊆Ξ−A
¬Ml(O,B)
and
exprA((Oj, Lj), A) =
∧
B;B={vi}⊆A
Ml′(O,B)∧
∧
∧
B;B={vi}⊆Ξ−A
¬Ml′(O,B)
Let exprB((Oj, Lj), C) = TRUE and exprA((Oj, Lj), D) = TRUE for some C and
some D. Obviously then for no other C and no other D the respective expressions are
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valid. It holds also that:
exprB((Oj, Lj), C) =
∧
B;B={vi}⊆C
M(Oj , Lj ∩B)∧
∧
∧
B;B={vi}⊆Ξ−D
¬M((Oj , Lj ∩ B)
and
exprA((Oj, Lj), D) =
∧
B;B={vi}⊆D
M(Oj , Lj ∩ L ∩ B)∧
∧
∧
B;B={vi}⊆Ξ−D
¬M(Oj , Lj ∩ L ∩B)
In order to get truth on the first expression, C must be a subset of Lj , and for the
second we need D to be a subset of Lj ∩ L. Furthermore, for a singleton F ⊆ Ξ either
M(Oj , Lj ∩ F ) = TRUE,M(Oj , Lj ∩ L ∩ F ) = TRUE, and then it belongs to C, L
and D, orM(Oj, Lj ∩F ) = TRUE,M(Oj , Lj ∩L∩F ) = FALSE, and then it belongs
to C, but not to L and hence not to D, orM(Oj, Lj ∩F ) = FALSE, so due to superset
consistency also M(Oj, Lj ∩ L ∩ F ) = FALSE, and then it belongs neither to C nor
to D (though membership in L does not need to be excluded). So we can state that
D = C ∩ L,
So the absolute expected frequency of objects for which exprA(D) holds, is given by:
∑
C;D=C∩L
samplecardinality ·mMlP (C)
that is:
∑
C;D=C∩L
samplecardinality ·mMlP (C) ·m
LP ;L(L)
which can be easily re-expressed as:
∑
C,G;D=C∩G
samplecardinality ·mMlP (C) ·m
LP ;L(G)
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So generally:
m
M
l′
P ′ (D) = c ·
∑
C,G;D=C∩G
mMlP (C) ·m
LP ;L(G)
with c - normalizing constant. Q.e.d.✷
Example 5 To continue Citizen Coot example let us recall the function BelMP from Example
3 which is one of an unlabeled population. Let us define the label
L = {(H,G), (H,B), (M,G), (M,B), (S,B), (D,B)}
as in Example 4. Let us define the labeling process function as
mLP ;L(L) = 1
∀B;B∈2Ξ,B 6=Lm
LP ;L(B) = 0
. Let us consider the function BelMlP ′ from Example 4. It is easily seen that:
BelMlP ′ = Bel
M
P ⊕ Bel
LP ;L
✸
Let us try another experiment, with a more general (re-)labeling process. Instead of a
single set of attribute values let us take a set of sets of attribute values L1, L2, ..., Lk (not
necessarily disjoint) and assign to each one a probability mLP,L
1,L2,...,Lk(Ai) of selection.
Definition 10 Let M be a measurement method, l be a labeling under this measurement
method, and P be a population under this labeling (Note that the population may also be
unlabeled). Let us take a set of (not necessarily disjoint) nonempty sets of attribute values
{L1, L2, ..., Lk} and let us define the probability of selection as a function mLP,L
1,L2,...,Lk :
2Ξ → [0, 1] such that
∑
A;A⊆Ξ
mLP,L
1,L2,...,Lk(A) = 1
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∀A;A∈{L1,L2,...,Lk}m
LP,L1,L2,...,Lk(A) > 0
∀A;A 6∈{L1,L2,...,Lk}m
LP,L1,L2,...,Lk(A) = 0
The (general) labelling process on the population P is defined as a (randomized) functional
LP : 22
Ξ
× ∆ × Γ → Γ, where Γ is the set of all possible labelings under M , and ∆ is a
set of all possible probability of selection functions, such that for the given labeling l and a
given set of (not necessarily disjoint) nonempty sets of attribute values {L1, L2, ..., Lk} and
a given probability of selection mLP,L
1,L2,...,Lk it delivers a new labeling l” such that for every
object ω ∈ Ω:
1. a label L, element of the set {L1, L2, ..., Lk} is sampled randomly according to the prob-
ability distribution mLP,L
1,L2,...,Lk; This sampling is done independently for each individual
object,
2. if Ml(ω, L) = FALSE then l”(ω) = ∅
(that is l” discards an object (ω, l(ω)) if Ml(ω, L) = FALSE
3. otherwise l”(ω) = l(ω) ∩ L (that is l” labels the object with l(ω) ∩ L otherwise.)
Again we obtain another (”smaller”) population P” under the labeling l” labelled a bit
differently. Also a new modified measurement method Ml” is induced by the ”re-labelled”
population. Please notice, that l” is not derived deterministicly. Another run of the general
(re-)labeling process LP may result in a different final labeling of the population and hence
a different subpopulation under this new labeling.
Clearly:
THEOREM 9 mLP,L
1,...,Lk is a Mass Function in sense of MTE.
Let BelLP ;L
1,...,Lk be the belief and P lLP,L
1,...,Lk be the Plausibility corresponding to
mLP,L
1,...,Lk. Now let us pose the question: what is the relationship between BelMl”P” , Bel
Ml
P ,
and BelLP,L
1,...,Lk.
THEOREM 10 Let M be a measurement function, l a labeling, P a population under this
labeling. Let LP be a generalized labeling process and let l” be the result of application of
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the LP for the set of labels from the set {L1, L2, ..., Lk} sampled randomly according to the
probability distribution mLP,L
1,L2,...,Lk;. Let P” be a population under the labeling l”. Then
The expected value over the set of all possible resultant labelings l” (and hence populations P”)
(or, more precisely, value vector) of BelMl”P” is a combination via Dempster’s Combination
rule of BelMlP , and Bel
LP,L1,...,Lk., that is:
E(Bel
M ′
l
P” ) = Bel
Ml
P ⊕Bel
LP,L1,...,Lk
.
PROOF: By the same reasoning as in the proof of Theorem 8 we come to the conclusion
that for the given label Li and the labeling l” (instead of l′ the absolute expected
frequency of objects for which exprA(D) holds, is given by:
∑
C;D=C∩Li
samplecardinality ·mMlP (C) ·m
LP ;L1,...,Lk(Li)
as the process of sampling the population runs independently of the sampling the set
of labels of the labeling process.
But exprA(D) may hold for any L
i such that C ⊆ Li, hence in all the exprA(D) holds
for as many objects as:
∑
i;i=1,...,k
∑
C;D=C∩Li
samplecardinality ·mMlP (C) ·m
LP ;L1,...,Lk(Li)
which can be easily re-expressed as:
∑
C,G;D=C∩G
samplecardinality ·mMlP (C) ·m
LP ;L1,...,Lk(G)
So generally:
E(mMl”P” (D)) = c ·
∑
C;D=C∩G
mMlP (C) ·m
LP ;L1,...,Lk(G)
with c - normalizing constant.Hence the claimed relationship really holds. Q.e.d.✷
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Example 6 The generalized labeling process and its consequences may be realized in our
Citizen Coot example by randomly assigning the sold bottles for evaluation to two ”experts”,
one of them - considering about 30 % of the bottles - is running the full M test procedure,
and the other - having to consider the remaining 70 % of checked bottles - makes it easier
for himself by making use of his belief in the labeling l of Example 4. ✸
6 Summary of the New Interpretation
The following results have been established in this Section:
• concepts of measurement and modified measurement methods have been introduced
• a concept of labelled population has been developed
• it has been shown that a labelled population with the modified measurement method
can be considered as Joint Belief Distribution in the sense of MTE,
• the process of ”relabeling” of a labelled population has been defined and shown to be
describable as a Belief Distribution.
• it has been shown that the relationship between the Belief Distributions of the resulting
relabeled population, the basic population and the relabeling process can be expressed
in terms of the Dempster-Rule-of-Independent-Evidence-Combination.
This last result can be considered as of particular practical importance. The inter-
pretation schemata of MTE elaborated by other authors (see the remark of Smets below)
suffered from one basic shortcoming: if we interpreted population data as well as evidence
in terms of their MTE schemes, and then combine the evidence with population data (un-
derstood as a Dempster type of conditioning) then the resulting belief function cannot be
interpreted in terms of the population data scheme, with subsequent updating of evidence
making thinks worse till even the weakest relation between the belief function and the (se-
lected sub)population is lost.
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In this paper we achieve a break-through: data have the same interpretation scheme after
any number of evidential updating and hence the belief function can be verified against the
data at any moment of MTE evidential reasoning.
Properties of the generalized labeling process should be considered from a philosophical
point of view. If we take one by one the objects of our domain, possibly labelled previously
by an expert in the past, and assign a label independently of the actual value of the attribute
of the object, then we cannot claim in any way that such a process may be attributed to
the opinion of the expert. Opinions of two experts may be independent of one another, but
they cannot be independent of the subject under consideration. This is the point of view
with which most people would agree, and should the opinions of the experts not depend on
the subject, then at least one of them may be considered as not expert.
This is exactly what we want to point at with our interpretation: the precise pinpointing
at what kind of independence is assumed within the Dempster-Shafer theory is essential for
its usability. Under our interpretation, the independence relies in trying to select a label
for fitting to an object independently of whatever properties this object has (including its
previous labeling). The distribution of labels for fitting is exactly identical from object
to object. The point, where the dependence of object’s labeling on its properties comes
to appearance, is when the measurement method states that the label does not fit. Then
the object is discarded. From philosophical point of view it means exactly that we try to
impose our philosophy of life onto the facts: cumbersome facts are neglected and ignored.
We suspect that this is exactly the justification of the name ”belief function”. It expresses
not what we see but what we would like to see.
Our suspicion is strongly supported by the quite recent statement of Smets that ”Far too
often, authors concentrate on the static component (how beliefs are allocated?) and discover
many relations between TBM (transferable belief model of Smets) and ULP (upper lower
probability) models, inner and outer measures (Fagin and Halpern [3]), random sets (Nguyen
[5]), probabilities of provability (Pearl [6]), probabilities of necessity (Ruspini [7]) etc. But
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these authors usually do not explain or justify the dynamic component (how are beliefs
updated?), that is, how updating (conditioning) is to be handled (except in some cases by
defining conditioning as a special case of combination). So I (that is Smets) feel that these
partial comparisons are incomplete, especially as all these interpretations lead to different
updating rules.” ([12], pp. 324-325).
Our interpretation explains both the static and dynamic component of the MTE, and
does not lead to any other but to the Dempster Rule of Combination, hence may be ac-
ceptable from the rigorous point of view of Smets. As in the light of Smets’ paper [12] we
have presented the only correct probabilistic interpretation of the Methematical Theory of
Evidence so far, we feel to be authorized to claim that our philosophical assessment of the
MTE is the correct one.
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